WritingAnthropicAnthropicpublished Jul 6, 2026seen 2w

Global Workspace

Open original ↗

Captured source

source ↗
published Jul 6, 2026seen 2wcaptured 2whttp 200method plain

A global workspace in language models \ Anthropic Interpretability A global workspace in language models Jul 6, 2026 Read the paper

As you read this sentence, circuits in your brain are adjusting your posture, controlling your breathing, and transforming lines and curves on the screen into recognizable words. Most of this processing is invisible to you. But some of what takes place in your brain you do have access to—an image that pops into your head, or a deliberate plan you make about where to go shopping. Neuroscientists and philosophers sometimes refer to the latter type of brain activity as “consciously accessible,” to distinguish it from all the other processing that goes on unconsciously. This activity has special properties: we can describe it, control it, and use it for deliberate reasoning, in contrast to all the automatic processing that goes on without our awareness. In a new paper, we present evidence that a similar distinction has emerged in modern language models like Claude. We find that Claude has developed a small collection of internal neural patterns that, compared to all its other internal processing, play a special role. We call the collection of these patterns the J-space —named after the technique we used to find them, involving a mathematical concept called the Jacobian. Each J-space pattern is linked to a particular word. But when one of these patterns lights up, it doesn’t mean the model is saying that word—just that the word is on its mind. If you've heard of language models having a "scratchpad" or “chain of thought”—text they write to themselves while reasoning—the J-space is something different. It operates silently, in the model’s internal neural activations, allowing the model to think about a concept without writing it down. Notably, the J-space wasn’t designed or programmed by us, but instead emerged on its own during Claude’s training process. The J-space reveals internal thoughts that don’t appear in the model’s output. We find that the J-space has a number of unique properties, compared to the rest of Claude's processing: Claude can report on these representations. If you ask Claude what it's thinking about, it will tell you what’s in the J-space. Non-J-space representations are less reportable. It can also modulate them on request. If you ask Claude to think about something, or solve a problem silently in its head, it will light up the appropriate patterns in its J-space. By contrast, it has trouble modulating patterns not in the J-space. Claude uses its J-space for internal reasoning. If you ask Claude to solve a problem that requires multiple steps, the intermediate steps will light up in its J-space, even when it doesn’t say them out loud. These J-space patterns causally mediate its performance in such tasks, despite being smaller in magnitude than other representations. Representations in the J-space can be used flexibly for many tasks—for example, once “France” has lit up in Claude’s J-space, the model can recall its capital, or its national currency, or the continent it belongs to. However, despite its important role, the J-space is not involved in most of what a language model does—speaking fluently, recalling simple facts, using correct grammar, etc. In experiments where we prevented Claude from using its J-space, it still interacted normally, but lost its higher-order cognitive functions.

Five functional properties of a global workspace, and stylized illustrations of experiments we use to test for them in language models. Our experiments were inspired by a prominent theory in neuroscience that was developed to explain how conscious access works: the global workspace theory . This account pictures the brain as a collection of specialist systems that work in parallel, unconsciously, and largely in isolation from one another. A piece of information becomes consciously accessible when it gains entry to a small shared channel, the “workspace,” which is broadcast to other brain systems that can see it and make use of it. Based on our findings, we think the J-space plays a similar “workspace” role in Claude. For example, we find evidence that Claude’s J-space has especially strong connections to the rest of its neural network, allowing it to fulfill this kind of broadcasting role. None of this tells us whether Claude is conscious in the way people are, or whether it feels anything at all; we’ll come back to that question at the end of the post. But whatever its philosophical significance, the J-space is a practically useful tool for us, as it gives us a way to see what Claude is thinking but not saying. For instance, we’re able to use it to catch Claude privately noticing that it’s being tested, intentionally producing fabricated data, or pursuing a hidden goal that we planted during training. We’ve also developed a technique to influence what lights up in Claude’s J-space, and thereby influence its decision-making. More broadly, these findings have changed our understanding of how Claude’s mind works, revealing a privileged mental workspace that can be used for deliberate reasoning, operating amidst a sea of more automatic, inflexible processing. Rather than being a chaotic jumble of numbers, Claude’s internals have organized themselves in a way that is reminiscent of our own minds. This post is a short summary of a much more extensive research paper , where you can find more detail on our experiments. We’ve also released a code repository with an open-source implementation of the core methods, and have partnered with Neuronpedia to provide an interactive demo of our methods on open-weights models. To provide additional perspectives on the broader implications of this work, we also invited commentary from several experts in neuroscience, philosophy, and LLM interpretability, which can be viewed here . How we found the J-space The starting point for this research was inspired by one of the key features of consciously accessible thoughts in humans: they can, unlike un conscious processing, often be put into words. If a thought is consciously accessible to you, you can typically describe it if someone asks. We went looking for representations in Claude with the same property: representations that are positioned to influence what Claude might say—not necessarily what it’s saying right now, but what it could talk about, if asked. Our technique is called the Jacobian lens, or J-lens for short. For every word in Claude's...

Excerpt shown — open the source for the full document.